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Title: UNGASS 2016: insights from Europe on the development of global cannabis policy 
and the need for reform of the global drug policy regime. 
Short title: UNGASS 2016: insights from Europe 
Abstract: 
Background and objectives: This article is framed by the forthcoming United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on drugs (UNGASS) debates on global drug policy.  It 
explores European drug policy experiences to draw out important lessons and insights that 
could be applied to wider global drug policy regimes.  Methodology: European experiences 
with (i) diverse cannabis policies and (ii) longstanding attempts to harmonise or coordinate 
diverse national drug policies in general are examined and the results are extrapolated to 
global drug policy debates.   Results: (i) the diversity of drug policy seen within EU borders 
should be viewed as a strength, (ii) flexibility under the international conventions is possible, 
but has limitations, (iii) changes to the global drug policy regime should seek to increase 
flexibility , and (iv) the importance of international institutions in providing a framework and  
an evaluatory role should not be under emphasised.  Conclusions: Collectively, the evidence 
suggests the need for the loosening of controls restricting the development of diverse drug 
policy innovations, and the development of international drug policy frameworks and 
international standards of drug-related data collection.  
Key words: drug policy reform, UNGASS 2016, European drug policy, cannabis policy reform, 
reform of the UN conventions 





Introduction: Tensions within the global drug policy regime 
Drug policy is predominantly decided at the national level as is evidenced by the wide 
variety of approaches taken by different global regions.  Most countries in the world, 
however, have signed up to international conventions committing them to prohibition 
oriented stances.  The United Nations (UN) 1961 single convention on narcotic drugs, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞƐĚƌƵŐĂĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƐ “ĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĞǀŝůĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ? ?ĨƌĂƵŐŚƚǁŝƚŚƐŽĐŝĂů
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĂŶŐĞƌ ? ?hŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
1971 convention on psychotropic substances and the 1988 convention against illicit traffic in 
narcotics and psychotropic substances.  The conventions themselves are the products of 
 “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ?ĞǁůĞǇ-Taylor, Jelsma & Blickman, 2014 :44) and are thus relatively 
ambiguous, leaving individual countries plenty of leeway, in particular around the 
criminalisation of drug consumption, and possession for personal consumption (Bewley-
Taylor, 2012a).  Since the 1980s, however, the UN drug-control machinery has adhered to 
ƚŚĞ ‘sŝĞŶŶĂŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ƉƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƚhat all must adopt a united front in the battle against the 
danger presented by illicit drugs.  The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), charged 
in 1968 with a watchdog role analysing compliance with the international conventions, has, 
since the 1980s, evolved its role to more of a guardian of their strictly prohibitive 
interpretation (Bewley-Taylor & Trace, 2006).  These developments have made the 
relaxation of drug policy controls generally more difficult. 
 




Despite the international conventions, there have always been countries (e.g. Uruguay) 
which never criminalised drug use or possession, and other countries (e.g. the Netherlands) 
which have practised decriminalisation since the 1970s (Rosmarin & Eastwood, 2012). 
Bewley-Taylor et al (2014:6) desĐƌŝďĞĂ “ƐĞĐŽŶĚǁĂǀĞ ?ŽĨĚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ
decade affecting Latin American countries, European countries, and various Australian 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ƐŽĨƚĚĞĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŚĂǀĞ “ĞǆƉůŽŝƚed plasticity within the treaties, while technically, 
remaining within their legal bounĚĂƌŝĞƐ ? ?ĞǁůĞǇdĂǇůŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?ď P ? ?).  They have mainly, but 
by no means exclusively, centred around cannabis which, in terms of the Vienna consensus 
and a more hardline interpretation of international prohibition commitments, has been 
described as the faultline  in the system (Bewley-Taylor, 2012a).  A third wave of reform, 
focused on cannabis, has recently been observed in the creation of regulated markets in 
Uruguay and some American States (e.g. Washington and Colorado).  Jelsma (2015:15) 
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞĂƐ “ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐ ?ƐŝŐŶĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞsŝĞŶŶĂĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĂŶĚ
the need for modernisation of the international drug conventions.  
 
The developments in cannabis policy and decriminalisation of drugs for personal use 
outlined above have combined with other important factors  W dramatic changes in our 
understandings of drug markets and the policies aiming to control them, an appreciation of 
the negative unintended consequences caused by stringently prohibitive drug policies, the 
rise of increasingly innovative harm reduction measures such as drug consumption rooms, 
ŽůŝǀŝĂ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhEĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƌĞĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
allow the traditional consumption of coca leaf -   to provide what some view as a potential 




 ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?>ĞŶƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞ global drug policy regime.  Some 
UN bodies have been broadly supportive of such reforms: the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Health Authority (WHO), for example, have 
expressed support for the decriminalisation of drugs for personal consumption (UNDP, 
2015) ?dŚĞ/E ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĂƐƉƌŽǀĞĚĂŶ “ŝŶĨůĞǆŝďůĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ ?(Bewley-
Taylor et al, 2014:6), gradually toughening its stance against drug policy reform/relaxation 
ƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?KǀĞƌƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ŝƚŚĂƐĂǀŽŝĚĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚƌŝĞĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
reform generally and consistently, and singled out countries with relaxed cannabis policies 
for criticism (Bewley-Taylor, 2012).  It operates in secret with no mechanisms for 
accountability (Csete & Wolfe, 2007 ?ĂŶĚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĐƵƐĞĚŽĨ “ƐƚŝĨůŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨthe 
ĚƌƵŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĞǁůĞǇ-Taylor & Trace, 2006:12).       
 
Although there are no built in review mechanisms for the international drug conventions 
(Jelsma, 2015), since the 1990s, United Nations General Assembly Special Sessions 
(UNGASS) on drugs have been held as a forum to discuss the future of the global drug policy 
regime.  UNGASS 1998 agreed to pursue the goal of the eradication of illicit drugs by 2008; 
in 2009 this goal was revised to achieving the eradication of, or significant reduction in, illicit 
drugs in the next 10 years.  The next UNGASS was due to be held in 2019, but was recently 
brought forward to April 2016 at the behest of the presidents of Colombia, Guatemala and 
Mexico, who called for an open and honest debate on the issues outlined above in light of 
significant recent changes in global drug policy. 
 




The special session will be used to debate many general issues  W human rights, harm 
reduction, prohibition  W but some have suggested that it could also be used as a platform to 
consider reform of the global drug policy regime:  “dŚĞŐůŽďĂůƚreaty regime should 
somehow show more flexibility in order to allow this irreversible dynamic of reform to 
influence, adapt and modernise the system.  That will be the main challenge for the 2016 
hE'^^ ? ?sĂƐĐŽŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ. 23).  This aspirational viewpoint is lent some support by the UN 
secretary general, Ban Ki-ŵŽŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĐĂůů ĨŽƌĂ “ǁŝĚĞ-ranging and open debate that 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐĂůůŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂŶ<ŝ-moon, 2013).  Jelsma (2015: 17), however, suggests that, to 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ? “ĂĐŽŶĐĞƌƚĞĚĞĨĨŽƌƚŝƐďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞ to keep the contentious treaty revision issue 
off the UNGASS 2016 agenda and to preserve the facade of global consensus ?.  While it 
seems unlikely at this stage that either cannabis policy or revision of the international drug 
conventions will be major features of the UNGASS 2016 debates, Lemahieu (2015:13) 
conceptualises the meeting as an important way stage to any rebalancing of the global drug 
ƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞŐŝŵĞĂŶĚĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŽĨĨĞƌƐ “ĂŶŝĚĞĂůƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƚŽƚĂŬĞƐƚŽĐŬŽĨůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚ
and new insights ĂůŝŬĞ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐƉŝƌŝƚ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ this article to explore experience 
with issues of drug policy reform in general, and cannabis policy reform in particular, within 
the European Union (EU).  The overall aim is not to explore in detail what official 
contributions the EU will make to UNGASS 2016, but rather to examine European drug 
policy experiences more generally, and to draw out important lessons and insights that 
could be applied to wider global drug policy regimes.  
 
A background to European drug policy 




European drug policy is organised in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, meaning 
that individual member states retain ultimate control of policy interventions, with European 
ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽŶůǇŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞŝƚĐĂŶďĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐďƌŝŶŐ “ĐůĞĂƌ
ĂĚĚĞĚǀĂůƵĞ ? ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ă P ? ?ƚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Union thus provides a framework within which national drug policies must operate, 
ensuring, for example, that all member states have a national drug strategy and action plan, 
provide a minimum level of harm reduction services (substitution treatment and needle 
exchange), and collect data on the nature of their drug problem.  National drug policy, 
however, varies widely.   
 
In Sweden, Ă ‘ĚƌƵŐĨƌĞĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽĂůŽĨĂ ‘ǌĞƌŽ-ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ
which does not designate cannabis as less harmful than other drugs, favours abstention 
based treatment over harm reduction, actively targets the users as well as the suppliers of 
drugs, and criminalises the consumption as well as possession of illegal substances.  In the 
Netherlands, meanwhile, some use of drugs in society is accepted as inevitable, and 
pragmatic national policies are implemented with a view to reducing the harm done by both 
drugs and drug policies, as well as limiting the supply and consumption of substances 
themselves.  Notably, cannabis is viewed as less harmful than other substances, and a semi-
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚŵĂƌŬĞƚďĂƐĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽ ‘ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ
ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĚƌƵŐƐ ?dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
approaches to the drug ƉƌŽďůĞŵŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶďĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŽŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? 
 




KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĐĂŶďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐ “ĂĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚǌŽŶĞŽĨƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ? ?ĞǁůĞǇ-
Taylor, 2012:324), with a diversity of innovative drug policies that already operate at the 
very boundaries of the UN conventions.  Good examples of this, in relation specifically to 
cannabis, include the cofeeshop system in the Netherlands where use and small scale sale 
of cannabis has long been tolerated, ĂŶĚŵƵĐŚŶĞǁĞƌ ‘ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĐůƵďƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĂĐƌŽƐƐ
Europe (Decorte, 2014) that exploit national legislative loopholes tolerating the growth of 
one or two cannabis plants for personal consumption, to allow the collective production of 
much larger amounts of cannabis.     Another example is decriminalisation (the removal or 
partial removal of criminal penalties in relation to certain drug offences), which was 
popularised by Portugal in 2001 and has swept across Europe.  Belgium, for example, 
decriminalised cannabis in 2003, while Estonia decriminalised the personal possession of all 
drugs in 2002, followed by Poland and the Czech Republic more recently (Rosmarin & 
Eastwood, 2012).   
 
On the other hand, in Sweden, drug policy remains a cross-party political issue with no 
legitimised discussion on either the relaxation of cannabis laws or the need for reform of 
the global drug policy regime  W rather balanced policies under the three UN conventions are 
strongly supported (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2014).  Other countries are 
increasing their penalties for drug-related crimes: Hungary increased penalties in 2013 and 
invested in a commitment to eradicate drugs by 2020; Bulgaria has proposed the 
replacement of fines for the possession of small amounts of drugs for personal consumption 
with imprisonment; and Italy remains outspoken against increasing harm reduction 
measures. 





sĂƐĐŽŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?ŚĂƐƵƌŐĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ “ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚhe most diverse experience, 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĂŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƌŽƵŶĚĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂ “ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?
(Sampaio, cited in Vasconi, 2013:10).  The problem with taking up this role, however, 
remains that while EU member states are generally able to get behind broad principles such 
as the importance of human rights or the value of public health and harm reduction as part 
of a balanced drug policy, they are much less able to agree on specifics such as what 
cannabis policy should look like or whether or not the UN conventions should be reformed.  
dŚĞhĚƌƵŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞƚŽ “ƐƉĞĂŬǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƐƚƌŽŶŐǀŽŝĐĞ ?
(European Council, 2013, p. 21) on matters of international drug policy, and it has partially 
fulfilled this promise: a recent EU joint statement prepared in anticipation of UNGASS 2016 
calls for a global and balanced evidence based policy of which harm reduction forms an 
essential element, the abolition of the death penalty, the meaningful participation of civil 
society, and the promotion of alternative development strategies (Martin Zanathy, 2015). 
 
But Europe cannot become a true  ‘ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
within its borders on either the need for change or the nature that change should take.  
Furthermore, being a signatory to the international conventions is a condition of 
membership, and the EU is therefore committed to promoting the aims outlined above 
within the existing conventions, while  “keeping the lid on politically inconvenient 
discussions about ƚƌĞĂƚǇƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? (Jelsma, 2015:18).  It can therefore be concluded that, 
while able to play a valuable role in key debates on harm reduction and human rights, the 
EU is not in a position to present a united front on the issues of cannabis regulation and the 




need for reform of the global drug policy regime.  Nevertheless, an exploration of European 
drug policy, focusing particularly on its experience of drug policy innovation and its long 
history of trying to engender convergence within highly divergent national policies, may 
shed pertinent light on the issues that are currently being struggled with at the global level.  
/ŶƚŚĞƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨ>ĞŵĂŚŝĞƵ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ
that can be gained from an in-depth examination of European drug policy, even if they will 
not be aired at UNGASS itself.  
 
 
First message: Drug policy diversity should be viewed positively: 
The discussion above has established that within the EU there exists a diversity of national 
policies aimed at controlling illegal substances.  In 1993 a European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was established, with the remit of collecting and freely 
disseminating data on the illicit drug situation in each Member State.  The work of the 
EMCDDA is now recognised as representing a gold standard in terms of information on the 
global drug situation, and it could therefore be anticipated that Europe might be in a 
position to pass judgement on what the evidence suggests is the most effective strategy for 
the control of illegal substances.  This, however, is not the case.  In part, this is because 
there are inherent problems in research that depends on the collation of data from many 
different countries (Hakim, 2000; Galtung, 1990).  More pertinently, perhaps, an 
examination of the EMCDDA data suggests that there is no relationship between style of 




drug policy and nature of the drug problem (Chatwin, 2011)  W a point which has also been 
made in relation to drug policy research more generally (Reinerman, Cohen & Kaal, 2004).   
 
Laying aside these considerable issues, there is a further problem, that only becomes more 
relevant at the global level: there are no universally accepted indicators of success for 
judging individual drug strategies (Flynn, 2001).  In Sweden, for example, the generally low 
levels of prevalence of drug use (EMCDDA, 2015) have been attributed to the uniformity 
and totality of their zero-tolerance approach to illicit drugs, and have been deemed to be a 
ƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉolicy in global terms (UNODC, 2007).  In the 
Netherlands meanwhile, where levels of prevalence are generally higher, the decreasing 
number of dependent drug users and the health and longevity of dependent users 
(EMCDDA, 2015 ? ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĚƌĂǁŶƵƉŽŶƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵƚĐŚ
approach (Grund & Breeksema, 2013). 
 
Given that every country experiences the problems associated with illicit drugs, from use to 
drug-related death and disease, but that different geographical locations may have 
somewhat different expressions of the problem,   it does not seem a particularly sensible 
strategy to seek to limit the overall number of policy options.  The variety of drug policy 
innovations in operation within the EU should therefore be viewed as a positive, especially 
underpinned as they are by the evaluatory role played by the EMCDDA.   Theoretically, at 
least, once innovative drug strategies have been implemented, they can be evaluated, 
shared widely, and adopted by other countries, regions or cities that have similar needs.  




This is a point that has also been made in relation to the developing global situation around 
the regulation of cannabis:  “experimentation alongside credible documentation and 
evaluation of effects not only improves the chances for evidence-based decisions, but also 
the chances for public acceptance ? (Uchtenhagen, 2014, p. 357).  The first message from 
Europe is therefore that drug policy diversity should be viewed positively. 
 
Second message: Drug policy diversity is possible under the UN conventions...but has 
significant limitations  
The varied range of cannabis policy in operation in Europe  W the zero tolerance approach in 
Sweden, the cannabis clubs emerging in Spain and elsewhere, the coffeeshop policy long 
operated in the Netherlands, and the decriminalisation of possession for personal use seen 
most notably in Portugal, but also in many other countries  W could be interpreted as a sign 
that considerable drug policy innovation is possible under the existing international 
conventions.  In a review of 50 years of drug policy under the Single Convention, Bewley-
Taylor & Jelsma (2011, p. 9) conclude that there is  “ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ ? ?
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƵƐĞĂŶĚƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŝůůĞŐĂůƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? As noted in 
the introduction, however, the INCB have played a consistent role in defending the status 
quo and blocking attempts to reform or relax any aspect of drug policy. It is the aim of this 
section to establish that, while this remains the case, there are significant limitations to the 
degree of flexibility achievable.  
 




One example of these limitations is provided by the coffeeshop system in the Netherlands 
which represents a pragmatic attempt to separate the markets for cannabis and other 
drugs, while working within the the UN conventions.  To this end, the use, purchase and 
small scale sale of cannabis is generally tolerated, and is primarily facilitated through the 
coffeeshop system.   A significant grey area inherent in this policy, however, is what Korf 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂƐƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ďĂĐŬĚŽŽƌ ?ŝƐƐƵĞ ?tŚŝůĞƵƐĞ ?ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĂŶĚƐŵĂůůƐĐĂůĞƐĂůĞŽĨ
cannabis may be tolerated, there exists no legal way for coffeeshops themselves to attain 
larger amounts of cannabis, because the production and commercial supply of cannabis is 
not tolerated.  This places coffeeshops in a precarious semi-legal position whereby the front 
door sales of cannabis are regulated, but the backdoor supply of coffeeshops remains in the 
hands of criminals.  A recent review of the NetherlanĚƐ ?ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚƐƉŽůŝĐǇ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ P “/ĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶĞůĞƐƐŽŶƚŽƚĂŬĞĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƚĐŚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚ
when taking steps towards regulating cannabis...these should include the entire chain of 
supply, from production to consumption ? (Grund & Breeksema, 2013, p. 12).  The current 
ĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉ ‘ďĂĐŬĚŽŽƌ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶůĂƌŐĞůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƵƚĐŚƚƌŝĞĚƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚ
their relaxation of cannabis policy in accordance with the terms of the international 
conventions:  Room & Mackay (2012, p. 7) therefore recognise that the international 
ƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐŚĂǀĞ “ďůŽĐŬĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĚƌƵŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞ
constrained efforts by governments to decriminalise possession of controlled drugs for 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƵƐĞ ? ?
 
Further limitations can be observed by a more general examination of decriminalisation.  
Many countries in Europe now operate some form of decriminalisation (removal of or 




reduction in criminal penalties) of the possession of drugs for personal use.  However, in an 
effort to stay within the parameters of the UN conventions, they often retain some form of 
civil or minor criminal penalties against those behaviours (Room, 2012).  Room & Reuter 
(2012) report that, despite widespread decriminalisation efforts towards cannabis, the 
number of cannabis users coming into contact with the criminal justice system has actually 
increased, and attributes that finding to the fact that civil or more minor criminal penalties 
are actually easier to enforce.  As penalties are reduced they become more likely to be 
operationalised and, counter-intuitively, the result is a widening of the net (Room, Fischer, 
Hall, Lenton & Reuter, 2010) of those caught up in efforts to control the use of drugs  W 
crucially, because countries are trying to work within UN conventions (Room, 2014; Room & 
Reuter, 2012).   Bewley-Taylor (2013, p. 61) therefore suggests ƚŚĂƚ “ǁŽrking inside the 
confines of the UN treaty system and generating changes in rather than changes of regime 
actually sustains larger structures of harm ?.  The examples provided above demonstrate 
that a strict interpretation of international treaties are impacting on the valuable ability to 
experiment with drug policy reform  
 
Third message: Any reform of the global drug policy regime should aim to open up the 
possibilities for drug policy innovation, rather than closing them down. 
 
Current EU thinking prioritises coordination of national ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂƐ “ŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?a, 
p. 8) suggesting that the closer national policies become in their legislative details the better 




(Chatwin, 2013).  To date, Framework Decisions represent the highest level of drug policy 
coordination within the EU, and commit member states to minimum standards in specific 
areas: drug trafficking penalties and the control of New Psychoactive substances (NPS).  An 
exploration of the effectiveness of these Framework Decisions, however, does not suggest 
that coordination of national policies is a goal worth pursuing  W a finding which has 
important implications for drug policy development at the global level. 
 
A Framework Decision (Council of the European Union, 2004b) was adopted in 2004 
outlining certain minimum rules for drug trafficking offences and has been heralded by the 
EU themselves as a  “ŵĂũŽƌƐƚĞƉ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐthe goal of drug policy coordination.  Official 
evaluations, however, have criticised its failure to result in an increased alignment of 
national measures seeking to control drug trafficking (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009).  For example, national penalties are usually much higher than those 
demanded by European legislation and, in the case of 12 member states, their national 
penalties are more than twice the range of those dictated at the EU level (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2009).  This piece of legislation, therefore, does no more than 
seek to represent the average of the 27 EU Member States, while failing to stand up to 
probing questions surrounding which drugs will be prioritised, which amounts will be 
considered as serious or what will be deemed aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
(Chatwin, 2013). 
 




NPS have increasingly been conceptualised as the most significant recent challenge to 
national and European drug policy making.  In 2005, further development of drug policy 
legislation was made at the European level via a Framework Decision (Council of the 
European Union, 2005) in this area.  The Decision established a mechanism for the exchange 
of information on NPS, but also provided an opportunity for those substances judged to be 
of unacceptable risk to be banned across the whole of Europe.  This Decision has also been 
evaluated with certain failures being prominently highlighted (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2011): namely that very few substances were being banned at the European 
level and that the bans were only implemented at the European level once most member 
states had already issued bans themselves .  Again, the results here suggest an 
approximation or average of EU legislation in the area of NPS, ultimately representing the 
bare minimum of policy practised across Europe (Chatwin, 2013). 
 
With these experiences in mind, a further message from Europe is that any reform of the 
internatŝŽŶĂůĚƌƵŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚƐĞĞŬƚŽ “ŽƉĞŶƵƉƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůŽƌ ? ? ?ĂƚƐƵďŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůƐ ? (Room & Mackay, 2012, p. 
8).  The considerable efforts that have been required to produce agreements across EU 
member states in the field of drug policy have not been fruitful in terms of increasing 
effectiveness or coherence of international drug policy.  The efforts required to engender 
agreement will only increase at the global level and there is no indication that they will be 
any more successful in terms of effectiveness.  Attempts to reform the UN international 
conventions should not then focus on trying to engender agreement across all signatories, 
but rather should be centred around trying to loosen the terms of the treaties, or the 




controlling grip of the INCB, so they do not prohibit or provide an obstacle to drug policy 
innovation and drug policy diversity. 
 
Fourth message: the importance of the international framework 
 
The final message from Europe contends that there is an important role to be played by 
international institutions in the framing and evaluation of global drug policy.  In terms of a 
framing role, rather than trying to force consensus and policy coordination, the UN could 
more usefully concentrate its efforts on ensuring that individual countries develop and 
adhere to minimum standards.  For example, as already practiced in the EU, it could 
mandate signatories to its international drug conventions to develop minimum harm 
reduction measures, to adhere to minimum human rights standards, and to develop 
national drug policy documents such as strategies and action plans. 
 
In terms of evaluation, the EMCDDA has the mandate within the EU to collect and 
disseminate data on the drug situation in each individual Member State.  As discussed 
above, many problems still remain with the cross-national comparability of data and the 
means by which success should be judged, making it impossible for the EMCDDA to draw 
definite conclusions about the effectiveness of one drug strategy over another.  
Nevertheless, the remit of the EMCDDA extends far beyond the gathering of statistics and 
also includes sharing incidences of best practice in drug policy making, bringing together 
networks of experts in the field, and encouraging evaluations of all aspects of national drug 




policy making.  This information is presented, not in an attempt to prove the validity of one 
approach to drug control over another, but to allow individual countries, regions and cities 
to pick and choose from innovations that have been tried and tested in locations 
experiencing similar drug problems, thus allowing them to choose the most suitable drug 
policy for their particular situation. 
 
Of course, the UNODC does already collect and disseminate information on the global drug 
problem, but ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ/EŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ “ŶŽƚ really interested 
ŝĨŝƚǁŽƌŬƐŽƌŶŽƚ ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶĞǁůĞǇ-Taylor et al, 2014: 37), only whether it was in line with 
the conventions.  The global drug policy machinery could usefully, therefore, move away 
from the isolated collation of statistics and the pronouncement of judgement about 
individual strategies based on their adherence to the existing conventions, and move 
instead towards the collation of evaluations of individual strategies for effectiveness, 
bearing in mind that different strategies are likely to work within different geographical and 
cultural locations (Chatwin, 2011).  Rather than seeking to decide which strategies are 
successful itself, any international evaluatory system should build evaluation into the 
development of any new drug policy, and make the resulting data available to all so 
individual governments or local authorities can make their own judgements about 
effectiveness based on local needs.  As noted earlier, problems remain at the EU level in 
trying to standardise international data so it is comparable: one of the main roles for the UN 
here could be the development of international standards around data collection, 
methodologies and the interpretation of key concepts such as drug-related death and drug-
related crime.  Working towards this goal would allow existing European data, or planned 




Russian research, to feed in to UN systems more easily.  Therefore, a major part of any 
discussions about reform of the global drug policy regime should be that an important - 
perhaps the most important - role of international institutions involved in responding to 
illicit drugs should be concerned with the evaluation of different strategies and the 
disseminating of that information.  
 
Conclusion  
An in-depth exploration of European drug policy therefore suggests that Europe does have 
important contributions to make on global debates about cannabis policy and the need for 
reform of the global drug policy regime.  Collectively, the evidence suggests the need for the 
loosening of controls restricting the development of diverse drug policy innovations, and the 
development of international drug policy frameworks and international standards of drug-
related data collection.  It is frustrating then that it is unlikely that these issues will be 
directly addressed at UNGASS 2016, with the EU committed to developing drug policy within 
the existing international framework and finding it difficult ƚŽ ‘ƐƉĞĂŬǁŝƚŚŽŶĞǀŽŝĐĞ ? in these 
contentious areas.  If, however, UNGASS 2016 is viewed as a time for reflection and the 
starting point of an opening up of the discussion around global drug policy issues, there is 
some hope that evidence from Europe could play an important role in emerging debates.  
While the EU may not be able to come down on one side or the other in terms of cannabis 
policy reform, it can demonstrably speak up in favour of the encouragement of drug policy 
diversity, whatever form that may take, and by whatever means it is achieved.  
Furthermore, while the EU may not be able to directly speak out in favour of the need for 
reform of the global regime, it can apply pressure in related areas such as the increased 




need for evidence based policy supported at the international level, and the need for the 
implementation of minimum standards in terms of harm reduction and human rights, for 
example. 
 
It is clear that some form of modernisation of the existing global drug policy regime is 
needed to bring international commitments in line with increasingly divergent national 
practices.  There are many ways that this could be achieved.  In the US, proposals for a more 
flexible interpretation of the international conventions have been made to avoid the 
difficulties associated with gaining global consensus on changing them (Barratt, Jelsma & 
Bewley-Taylor, 2014).  Bewley-Taylor et al (2014) suggest that this would suit the EU 
because they would be able to justify the varied innovative policy strategies within their 
borders without becoming embroiled in contentious debates about the need for treaty 
reform.  Jelsma (2015), however, cautions that, ultimately, the UN drug control system will 
be weakened by a general relaxation of the rules, as important international standards 
around, for example, human rights, will also be eroded.   
 
Following this line of argument, there are still options for more radical reform: the 
rescheduling of cannabis via a WHO review, amendments to the international conventions, 
individual denunciation of the single convention followed by reaccession with reservation, 
the modification inter se of the treaty between certain likeminded parties (e.g. a group of 
EU countries) (Bewley-Taylor, 2012), or the drawing up of a new Single Convention.   What 
seems clear is that this is likely to be a gradual process akin to the ending of alcohol 




prohibition in the US (Bewley-Taylor et al, 2014).  Jelsma (2015) suggests that a useful 
outcome of UNGASS 2016 discussions would be the creation of an expert group to examine 
the options for reform of the global drug policy regime to bring it in line with recent drug 
policy developments.  While the EU will not directly speak out on these issues at UNGASS 
2016, it may be more possible to feed into general reviews of the existing system as part of 
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